It is real. About four years after its launch, the PlayStation 3's much vaunted security has finally been completely and unequivocally compromised. Within weeks, or even days, PS3 users prepared to pay an exorbitant premium have the option of copying just about every one games they own - and any they don't - onto harddrive, and absolutely nothing stops them from spreading them across the internet. Now you ask ,, how do Sony deal with the problem? Can new firmware updates maintain the platform holder one step ahead of the hackers?
As sample "PS Samurai" hardware circulates around shops and modship suppliers all over the world, further details emerge, giving us some prospect of how the system works. From that we can extrapolate the size of the task facing Sony since it embarks on what must surely be the biggest damage limitation exercise in its recent history. This attack on PStation security involves both software and hardware. A USB dongle is connected to the P3, and pressing the eject button on the console while it cold-boots causes the code on the stick to override the console's typical launch procedure. By looking at views of the XMB observed in the now numerous YouTube videos, the dongle appears to inject elements from debug PS3 firmware onto the retail unit. The option to install PKG files, available only on development and test units, now works on the retail machine. From here, the primary tool to "backing up" software is added onto the machine.
While you might not have heard of a PKG file before, the it's likely that you've installed a good amount of them on your Playstation 3. Almost every types of program you download from PSN is within the PKG container. Once downloaded, the PS3 decompresses the comprehensive data and installs it onto your PS3. On development and test/reviewer units, so-called "unsigned code" is routinely distributed on disc, via download or on USB flash drives in PKG format. The only real difference between this and a regular PSN download is the fact that code isn't encrypted, enabling easier distribution of unfinished or review copy games (only Sony's mastering labs can encrypt, or "sign" code). The fact that the Install PKG option now appears on a retail unit gives us a substantial indication as to how the new "Jailbreak" works as it's almost certainly not present in the regular firmware. It suggests that aspects of the bespoke system updates used on the debug PS3s are being injected into the memory of the retail unit. But exactly how?
There's 2 potential explanations here. For starters, whoever is behind this is extremely clever and has isolated an exploit that enables for the injection of code over the USB port. Much more likely is the fact that USB-based tools Sony uses to test and recover PS3s with corrupt firmware have been leaked and reverse-engineered for more nefarious ends. PlayStation 3s locked into "factory service mode" have already been popping up every now and again for years, and the PC-side software that runs the USB dongle was leaked a while ago.
Now it would appear that the hardware has also been "liberated" from Sony's repair and test labs. This may sound somewhat implausible, however in a world where PS3 Slim photos circulate months prior to the launch and final units appear in a Philippines marketplace, anything is possible. Besides, the identical thing happened with the tools used to service the PSP right before the PSP-2000 launch in September 2007. In terms of the make-up of the dongle itself, pictures posted online of the internals show a simple USB device - what appears like an innocuous 48-pin microcontroller chip on the tiny PCB and not much else. It's quite astonishing to think that the makers are requesting a colossal $130 for such a tiny piece of tech, and it's almost certain to be reverse-engineered, ripped off and duplicated by the Chinese mass-suppliers within days of showing up in the market.
The software side of PS Samurai is publicly available to download, installs onto a debug PS3 and throws up few surprises. It's a very basic tool that rips off each file on a game disc onto the internal HDD or else onto a USB flash drive or hard disk drive. It does appear that a few of the encryption Sony uses on the files is stripped away (hashes on encrypted files change drastically), however executable still won't work without the USB dongle in place. When selecting a game to run, the device drops back to the XMB. From here on out, we could only speculate but it's reasonable to assume that the chip then diverts all major disc functions to the device where the game-rip lies. As a considerate vehicle for piracy then, all bases are covered, but is this really a "jailbreak" in the form recently sanctioned by the US courts? The mere existence of the backup manager - supposedly coded with tools stolen from Sony - would suggest otherwise, and if the USB dongle is indeed cloned from the platform holder's own recovery tools, any pretence of legality is surely a joke.
The inclusion of the PKG installation option does indeed imply that the likes of emulators and media players could possibly be ported and installed on to the PS3. However, for now it's most likely the case that Sony's own dev tools will be needed to make any kind of useful application, adding to the legality quagmire. All told, it's a nightmare scenario for Sony - but you could be fairly sure that its response is going to be swift. We can easily fully expect a mandatory firmware update to emerge from its engineering labs within days of the firm dissecting the hack, doubtless making it useless. Damage limitation will be the key, and exactly like the OtherOS removal that Geohot's exploit brought about, Sony might be trying to minimise the physical number of consoles available capable of running the hack by effectively upgrading them out of contention.
Assuming the memory patch theory does work, the swiftness of the response shouldn't be a challenge for Sony's engineers. Changing the make-up of the modules affected might possibly be child's play for the platform holder and it would almost definitely necessitate a much higher effort on the part of the hackers to reverse-engineer the newest code and re-patch it. Additionally, on the long run, there's nothing to prevent Sony from introducing brand-new forms of encryption and execution in the process that future games boot.
However, the properties of the USB dongle itself may well be more difficult to defend against. Assuming that the device itself comes from Sony's own servicing tools, this could demand a complete, brand-new revision of motherboard to successfully defeat. The main purpose of the dongle is to restore corrupt firmware - the chances are it has to function on a hardware level that can't be touched by the updater. We've seen it before on Sony kit - the so-called "Pandora" battery for PSP that flips it into service mode operates about the same principle, and was just defeated by the platform holder when it revised the handheld's motherboard. Nothing could be done to protect the existing devices.
Unless Sony is competent at rewriting the standard low-level code for the PS3's BIOS, there's little it can do today to defeat the USB vector of attack - it's all about preventing the injected code from working. Going forward we can expect the same old cat and mouse game between hackers and platform holder to unfold, and it's not beyond the realms of possibility that in the future, Sony should be able to detect people that use the tool and rightfully ban them from accessing PSN, similar to the measures Microsoft is constantly on the undertake annually against gamers who flash their DVD drives running copied software.
The complexness of Sony's security systems suggests that it should be able to keep one step ahead, however, there is nothing to stop people using the hack to prevent firmware upgrades from going down. Indeed, the chip is believed to protect the console from executing system updates. This of course precludes PSN access, and in the fullness of time this approach will stop newer PS3 games from running as they will be reliant on software elements found only inside newer firmware. Bearing in mind that PS Samurai is retailing for well over $130, there's a very strong possibility that this could well be the most expensive and short-lived hack ever made, and factoring in the simplicity of the hardware, the very high price seems almost reminiscent of a smash-and-grab raid on users intent on piracy regardless of the purchase price. The manufacturers of PS Samurai are charging so high price because of the window of opportunity regarding exclusivity and the longevity of the hack itself is potentially very small.
Even so, the exact properties of this USB stick and how future-proof it's remain unknown. With mass-production of PS Samurai now in motion, and the first retail devices apparently set to ship prior to the month is up, Sony's engineers are doubtless gearing up for the battle to come.
As spotted on: Hack of the day
